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The role of theory when studying epistemological characterizations
of mathematics lecture(r)s

Magnus Österholm1
Introduction and background
The study presented in this paper is a contribution to the scientific discussion about the role and use of
theory in mathematics education research. In particular, focus is here on the use of and comparison
between different types of theories and frameworks, which is discussed primarily through the example
of an empirical study examining what types of messages about mathematics are conveyed in lectures.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine how different types of theories and frameworks can affect
different parts of the research process.
The role of theory in research
In research, the use of theory is an important and frequently discussed issue. When publishing research
reports, it is most often a demand that you should relate to a theory. This centrality of theory is also
evident from how different researchers describe the relationship between research and theory. Silver
and Herbst (2005) discuss a general function of theory when they place it in the centre of the
scholarship triangle, which consists of research, problems, and practice, where theory functions as a
connection between all three parts of the triangle. Lester (2005, p. 458) describes four general
purposes of using a research framework (later I discuss relationships between similar notions such as
theory and framework); to give structure to a research study, that a framework is always needed for
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data to make sense, to come further than common sense, and in order not to be limited to finding
answers to local problems. Also Niss (2006, 2007) describes different general purposes and functions of
a theory, for example to predict or explain phenomena, to organize observations and interpretations
into a coherent whole, and to give a methodology for empirical studies.
The descriptions above are from a general perspective, but if we think more specifically about the
different parts of a research study it could be of interest to, as Bergsten (2008, p. 190) does, ask how “a
theoretical basis adopted for a study influence the nature of the purpose, questions, methods,
evidence, conclusions, and implications of the study”. This highlights the potential of a theory to affect
all parts of a research study. However, for a specific study it might be that some choices in some parts
of the study are not based on a given theory and there are also “numerous cases where [...] the
research is carried out without really involving the theory which is being invoked” (Niss, 2006, p. 9).
The diversity of theories
If theory does, or should, play a central role in all or many parts of a research study, how should we
handle the situation when different studies that focus on the same phenomenon use different types of
theories? One problem can then be to build new research on previous research if different theories are
used, since:
Taking isolated research results at face value, without relating them to the conditions and
constraints of the research processes behind them, provides no criteria or bases for relating them
to other seemingly contradictory or similar results. (Bergsten, 2008, p. 189)
To relate results to the theory that has been used in the process of producing these results is therefore
an important aspect. However, it is not necessarily the case that research based on different theories,
which can even be partially contradictory, produces results that are impossible to combine in some
way, for example if the contradictory parts of the theories are not relevant for the studies in question.
As previously mentioned, it can also be that the parts of specific research studies that are compared are
not dependant on the given theory. This relationship is also highlighted by Prediger’s (2008, pp. 284‐
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285) conclusions from a comparison between researchers’ use of different theories: “the theoretical
base alone did not completely predetermine their conceptualizations”, showing that “research
practices and theoretical bases of course are strongly connected, but it would be a misleading
simplification to propose a direct causal or deterministic connection”. It is therefore not enough to
focus on the comparison of theories in themselves, whether (partially) contradictory or (fully)
compatible theories are used, but it is important to become more specific regarding if and how theory
affects different parts of the research process. This issue is examined in the present study.
Regarding how to relate different theories to each other, Bikner‐Ahsbahs and Prediger (2006) describe
four different ways to do this; unify, integrate, network, and compete/compare. To unify refers to the
creation of one theory from several theories that deal with the same phenomenon, while to integrate
refers to the combination of different, but compatible perspectives. Networking refers to a strategy
that includes for example both comparing and integrating theories, and demands cooperation between
different research groups that represent different research cultures. The present study focuses mainly
on compete/compare, “by treating the same set of data from the basis of different theories, similarities
and differences of theories can be specified although the diversity is respected” (p. 55). There are
several examples of studies that have compared different theories regarding how they affect some
part(s) of the research process; Prediger (2008) examines the effect on the formulation of research
questions, while several other studies examine the analysis and interpretation of a given set of data
from different theoretical perspectives (Bergsten, 2008; Bergsten & Jablonka, 2009; Even & Schwarz,
2003; Gellert, 2008), often highlighting the effect of theory on several aspects/parts of the research
process. All these comparative studies show clear differences in the descriptions and interpretations
that are done based on different theories. The authors also discuss more detailed relationships
between theory and some part of the research process.
Bergsten and Jablonka (2009) note that from observing the same situation, described through
transcripts of student dialogues, the analyses based on two different theories have actually not used
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the same data, partly because focus is on different parts of the transcripts and partly because one
theory demands more data than what is present in the transcripts. Although much of the method,
regarding the collection and presentation of data, was given beforehand as a common starting point for
both theories, this example shows an effect of theory on methodology in a more intricate manner.
However, to say that the theory is affecting the methodology might not be suitable, but perhaps
methodology should be seen as a part of the theory, which for example Radford (2008) is suggesting.
More discussion about what constitutes a theory is given later.
When Gellert (2008, p. 221) compares the use of two different theories, he finds that interaction
patterns are described as “emerging” in one theory and as “reflections of macro‐social structures” in
the other theory, and he remarks that “emergence and structure are quite opposite concepts”. Despite
this apparent contradiction between the theories, Gellert suggests a way of coordinating the results
originating from the use of these two theories. He creates a combination of the two perspectives that
could be seen as having “improved the usefulness and accuracy of the interpretation” (p. 223), but
leaves it up to the reader to judge if this is actually the case. In line with the work of Gellert, one way to
look at the combining of studies that focus on the same phenomenon but use different theories could
then be to view the use of different theories as looking at the same thing from different angles or
perspectives. The use of different theories is then not seen as a problem of having or creating potential
contradictions, but that the use of different theories will complement each other. This is in line with
Bikner‐Ashbahs and Prediger (2006, p. 54) who do not see diversity of theories as a defect but as
richness and as showing the character of the subject regarding its complexity; “we should not aim to
reduce this complexity. Instead, the richness gained should be better exploited”. In similar fashion,
Even and Schwarz (2003, p. 309) note that a classroom situation is too complex to be understood from
only one perspective, and that a more complete understanding requires the use of different
perspectives.
Above, the potential benefits of seeing the same thing from different perspectives are highlighted, but
is it actually “the same thing” that is being examined so that different theories could be said to
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complement each other? Similarly, are two theories contradictory when they include or produce
contradictory statements about “the same thing”? For example, just because two theories claim to be
about learning, are they then comparable in the sense that you can see them as potentially
contradictory, or are the theories actually focusing on different things and just using the same word for
these things? This problem is discussed by Rodriguez, Bosch, and Gascón (2008), regarding the difficulty
to say that theories deal with the same questions since they see each theory as defining and
formulating their own problems without there being an easy way to “translate” between theories. In
their study they examine the notion of metacognition, which is a concept created in one theory and
they see a difficulty in translating it to another theory. Instead of focusing directly on the concept, they
examine the original practical problem that created the need for the notion of metacognition in the
theory in question, and then focus on this problem when trying to translate to another theory. Based
on this example, the authors argue that all comparisons between theories need to be done via the type
of problematic situations or issues that were the origin to the specific content of a theory. Perhaps this
could be seen as looking for a least common denominator for theories, regarding the type of event,
situation or phenomenon that can actually, to some extent, be seen as “the same thing” seen from
different perspectives. This idea shifts focus from looking at differences to looking at potential
commonalities regarding relationships between different theories. In the present study, both
similarities and differences between theories are discussed in relation to empirical data.
The concept of theory
Theory has so far been discussed without giving an explicit definition of this notion, which sometimes
seems possible to do, thus basing the discussion on some type of common understanding of this notion,
perhaps created through common properties of examples of constructs labeled as theory. However, the
existing “absence of clear definitions of ‘theory’ and ‘theoretical’ in many publications that invoke these
terms” (Niss, 2007, p. 1308) becomes problematic if we wish to go deeper in our awareness of the use
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of theory in research. Therefore, we also need to discuss what we mean by ‘theory’ and relate this
meaning to comparative studies of theories in use.
There are many concepts in use that seem to relate to some aspect of theory in research; “Model.
Construct. Theory. Paradigm. Framework. To some, these words have vastly distinct meanings, while to
others they are separated by shades of grey” (Mewborn, 2005, p. 1). Words like approach and
perspective can also be added to the list, and also that some of the words can be combined, for
example in ‘theoretical framework’. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss and define all these
words here. Instead, my discussion is limited to the two notions that seem most commonly referred to
in discussions about theory in research; theory and framework. The works of Niss (2006) and Radford
(2008) are utilized regarding the notion of theory while the work of Lester (2005) is utilized regarding
the notion of framework and to some extent also regarding the notion of theory.
Niss (2006) defines a theory as consisting of an organized network of concepts and claims, where the
concepts are linked in a connected hierarchy and where claims are either fundamental (i.e. of axiom
type) or derived from the fundamental claims. Radford (2008) defines theory as consisting of a system
of basic principles (P), a methodology (M), and a set of paradigmatic research questions (Q). There are
many similarities and overlaps between these two definitions. Basic principles can be regarded as
claims of a certain kind, which also methodology can since Niss describes that theories can function as
methodology. Concepts are not mentioned as one separate part of a theory by Radford, but P is
“characterized by its hierarchical structure and the ensuing meaning of its key concepts” (Radford,
2008, p. 320), highlighting the similarity with the definition by Niss.
The set of paradigmatic research questions is not found in the definition of theory by Niss (2006), and
he does not discuss the relationship between research questions and theory. Radford (2008) describes
Q as “templates or schemas that generate specific questions” (p. 320) and not as a fixed set of
questions. His reason for including Q in the definition of theory is that “because they [theories] emerge
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as responses to particular problems, they bear the imprint of the initial questions that they sought to
answer” (p. 321).
In this paper, I choose to define theory in accordance with Radford (2008). This choice is made because
Radford describes a structure that is easier, compared to the one given by Niss, to relate to when
comparing the use of different theories, which is also the focus of the article by Radford.
Mason and Waywood (1996) describe two aspects of the use of theory; as foreground or background
theory, which can be related to that it is not only theory that is explicitly referred to that affects
research. Both these aspects can be labeled as theory also when using the definition by Radford (2008,
p. 320) since the system of basic principles “includes implicit views and explicit statements”. The notion
of approach, defined by Bergsten (2008, p. 192) as “a more informal inclination by the researcher to
interpret an observed commonsensical problem”, can therefore also be included in the notion of theory
as defined by Radford.
The relationship between research questions and theory was highlighted through the definition of
theory by Radford, and is also an important issue in Lester’s (2005) discussions about different types of
frameworks, in particular regarding theoretical and conceptual frameworks. For a theoretical
framework, there is reliance on a formal theory and research questions “would be rephrased in terms
of the formal theory that has been chosen” (p. 458), while:
A conceptual framework is an argument that the concepts chosen for investigation, and any
anticipated relationships among them, will be appropriate and useful given the research problem
under investigation (Lester, 2005, p. 460).
The use of theory is not limited to the theoretical framework, since conceptual frameworks “may be
based on different theories” (Lester, 2005, p. 460). The difference between the two types of
frameworks seems to be the ordering of theory and research questions; in a theoretical framework the
theory decides what types of questions can be asked while in a conceptual framework the questions
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affect the choice of theory. Frameworks in general could then be described as different ways of doing
research, in particular regarding different ways of using theory, while theory (as defined by Niss and
Radford) can be seen as a type of structure of concepts and statements. This view of frameworks is
somewhat different than what is presented by Bergsten (2008), when he discusses the role of different
types of frameworks in the process of analyzing data, also referring to Lester when utilizing the notion
of framework. Bergsten focuses on the multitude of sources/theories as a central aspect of conceptual
framework, for example when discussing one specific study; “the research framework [is] conceptual,
since the study uses theoretical concepts from various sources rather than one overarching theory” (p.
193). I do not see the number of sources/theories as the main difference between the two types of
frameworks because it becomes problematic what constitutes one theory or several theories and, as
argued above, I interpret Lester’s descriptions of different frameworks as primarily be about different
ways of relating theory and research questions.
Lester does not define the notion of theory, and the general definition of framework seems quite
similar to the definition of theory used in this paper; “a research framework is a basic structure of the
ideas (i.e., abstractions and relationships) that serve as the basis for a phenomenon that is to be
investigated” (Lester, 2005, p. 458). The relationship between framework and theory is therefore not
easy to sort out. A more in‐depth analysis of this relationship is not done here, but I choose to
characterize the different types of frameworks based on the different relationships between research
questions and theory as described above.

Purpose and structure of the present paper
The main purpose of this paper is to examine how different types of theories and frameworks can affect
different parts of the research process, when using the notions of framework and theory as described
earlier. More specifically, the discussions in this paper focus on two aspects:


The utilization of different types of frameworks and different types of theories.



Relationships between different parts of the research process and different parts of theories.
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The aim is not to discuss the use of theories only from a “theoretical perspective” but the discussions
also focus on the content and structure of a specific empirical study; about epistemological
characterizations of mathematics lectures (this topic is discussed more in the next section). In relation
to this specific research topic, a purpose is also to examine if/how it seems possible to unify or
integrate different theories used when studying this topic, and not only to compare them. I have
examined some aspects of both comparison and integration of theories related to this research topic
before (Österholm, 2009), but then without relating to a specific empirical study and without a more in‐
depth view of the notion of theory.
Thus, in order to discuss the use of theory in research, an empirical study is used as a starting point.
This empirical study is described in the next section, as a study in itself including descriptions of
background, purpose, method, analysis of results, and conclusions, and thereby becoming somewhat
separated from the overarching purpose of the present paper. However, the description of the
empirical study is not as elaborate as could be expected if the study was reported independently, partly
in order not to make this paper as a whole too long and partly in order to create a better overview of
the empirical study for the discussion of the use of theory. Some parts of the empirical study is
therefore affected by and adjusted to the overarching purpose of discussing the role of theory in
research. The empirical study can therefore be seen as somewhat “artificial”. The same empirical study
has been described elsewhere (Österholm, 2010), where some parts of it are more elaborately
described, but also where the focus is different; on exploring and discussing the methodology of the
study.
Similarly as Prediger (2008), a type of “classroom problem” or “issue of classroom practice” is taken as
the starting point for the discussions of the use of theory in research. In contrast to the study of
Prediger, research questions are then not discussed from the perspective of some given theories, but
the first step is here the use of a conceptual framework in relation to the given problem. Thereafter,
the method of the empirical study is described, followed by the results and conclusions. The
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conclusions are the end of the separate empirical study, and thereafter the focus is redirected to
discussing the issue of use of theory in different ways in relation to the presented empirical study.
Firstly, in relation to the given conclusions from the empirical study, the need to “add more theory” is
discussed, as a means to be able to interpret the conclusions in a broader perspective. At this point, the
use of two different theories is discussed, in particular regarding a comparison between them based on
the definition of theory by Radford (2008) and in relation to different parts of the research process.
Finally, the focus is directed to the differences between conceptual and theoretical frameworks by
analyzing if/how some part of the empirical study would have been different if a conceptual framework
had not been the starting point, but if one of the two theories introduced in relation to the
interpretation of the conclusions had been used together with the given classroom problem as a
starting point for the whole empirical study, that is, if a theoretical framework had been used. Besides
being able to compare the use of different frameworks, this utilization of different theories also allows
for an analysis of relationships between parts of the research process and parts of theories, in particular
since these theories are introduced at a late stage in the process but then also related to other parts of
the research process.

The empirical study
Introduction
The teaching activities in a mathematics classroom can be very different, depending on the content, the
teacher, the students, available materials, the classroom environment, etc. The subject of mathematics
can have very different character depending on these properties of teaching activities, that is, that
properties of the teaching situation can produce different pictures or characterizations of mathematics.
The focus in this empirical study is on this type of issue of classroom practice, regarding how certain
properties of teaching can give different pictures of mathematics.
Others have studied this type of issue, for example regarding what properties of mathematics “is
conveyed by mathematics textbooks” (Raman, 2004, p. 389) where a comparison between different

TME, vol9, no.3, p .441

textbooks showed “conflicting messages regarding the status and purpose of mathematical
definitions”. Shield (1998, p. 516) also examines textbooks, in order to “identify the types of messages
about mathematics [...] inherent in their presentations”, where messages in textbooks is shown to
differ compared to “the intent of recent reports and syllabuses” (p. 521).
Ikonomou, Kladrimidou, Sakonidis, and Tzekaki (1999, p. 170) focus their analysis on properties of
mathematics lessons regarding “epistemological features” of the lessons, by examining how the teacher
handles “the nature, meaning and definition of concepts, the validation procedures and the
functionality of theorems”. Their conclusions focus on a comparison with mathematics as a discipline,
and they see large differences, for example that activities in the classroom are reduced to procedures
and that central notions are not separated (such as definition and theorem).
Although using different notions, I see the given examples of previous studies as focusing on the same
kind of phenomenon, regarding a characterization of some properties of teaching that can be
interpreted as messages about mathematics. Similar to the examples of other studies, the purpose of
the present empirical study is to examine the types of messages about mathematics inherent in, or
conveyed by, properties of teaching.
In order to be able to focus on this issue in a research study, we need to discuss in more detail what can
be meant by pictures of, or messages about, mathematics, and also to limit the study to focus on some
aspect/property of teaching. In addition, it is also needed to discuss how to examine certain properties
of teaching as messages about mathematics, in order to plan and carry out an empirical study focusing
on this issue. Thus, there is a need to discuss these central aspects and concepts, which can be done
through a conceptual framework, in order to have a structure for conceptualizing and designing the
research study (Lester, 2005).
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A conceptual framework
Messages about mathematics can be related to the basic philosophical issues of epistemology and
ontology, that is, the nature of knowledge and the existence/location of (mathematical) entities
respectively. The discussions are here limited to epistemological aspects, through two questions
regarding the nature of knowledge; what knowledge is and how knowledge is acquired, which are
shortly referred to as questions about properties of knowledge and knowing respectively.
There are many aspects of epistemology, and many types of epistemologies, in relation to mathematics
and mathematics education (Sierpinska & Lerman, 1996), so there is a need to limit the focus of the
present study, which is done by focusing on one central aspect in relation to each of the two mentioned
questions about knowledge and knowing. In relation to knowledge, I relate to a central distinction in
mathematics education regarding two different types of knowledge; conceptual and procedural
knowledge (Hiebert, 1986). In relation to knowing, I relate to properties of argumentation (Toulmin,
1958), regarding the process of drawing conclusions.
A next step is to relate these two aspects of epistemology to properties of teaching. Among the
examples of similar studies done before, which examine messages about mathematics inherent in some
properties of the teaching situation, some have focused on epistemological aspects; regarding
properties of textbooks (Raman, 2004) and regarding properties of classroom activities (Ikonomou et
al., 1999). For the present empirical study, I choose to focus on properties of oral communication,
because it is a very central aspect of teaching and it is more focused than to examine classroom
activities more generally. I also choose to limit the study to focus on one‐way communication; lectures,
in order to reduce the complexity somewhat by not including aspects of dialogue or discussions among
several persons.
Thus, the focus of the present empirical study is properties of oral communication that could be said to
convey something about epistemological aspects of mathematics. The communication can include
explicit statements about knowledge and knowing in mathematics, but also other properties of
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communication can represent certain aspects of knowledge or knowing. Since the most common
activity in a lecture probably is to present mathematics and not to talk about mathematics (from an
epistemological perspective), the present empirical study focuses not on explicit statements about
epistemology.
The types of statements used in a lecture could highlight the epistemological aspect regarding the
nature of knowledge. In relation to conceptual and procedural knowledge, I therefore separate two
main types of statements; statements about the use of mathematical objects, labeled use‐statements
(related to procedural knowledge) and statements about properties of mathematical objects, labeled
object‐statements (related to conceptual knowledge). Here I choose to use the more general notion
‘mathematical object’, which can refer to concepts as well as procedures. The difference between the
two types of statements is therefore that they describe either properties of objects or the use of such
objects, which is seen as a central aspect regarding the difference between conceptual and procedural
knowledge. For example, the statement “The derivative of ln x is one over x” is an object‐statement
while the statement “When you take the derivative of ln x you get one over x” is a use‐statement.
As mentioned before, the types of argumentations could highlight the epistemological aspect regarding
the nature of knowing. For the limited purpose of this empirical study, I choose to use a simplified
version of the elaborate structure of argumentation presented by Toulmin (1958). This simplified
structure consists of a conclusion that is drawn (or a claim, using Toulmin’s vocabulary) together with
statement(s) used as argument for this conclusion (or data, using Toulmin’s vocabulary). The words or
wordings used to make explicit the argumentative relationship between statements (e.g. words such as
‘therefore’ and ‘since’) are here labeled connect‐words. These words or wordings are of great
importance when locating arguments, and focus can be put on these types of words in the analysis of
types of argumentations.
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When focusing on the types of statements and the types of argumentations, focus is not on the
mathematical content of the statements or the argumentations, and the purpose of the analysis in this
empirical study is not didactical, in the sense that the focus is not on aspects of teaching and learning
the mathematical content nor on the teaching and learning of argumentation or proving. Instead, the
analysis of types of statements and types of argumentations in lectures is used in order to draw
conclusions about what is conveyed about mathematics, in particular regarding epistemological
aspects.
In summary, the conceptual framework used in this empirical study focuses on epistemological
properties of oral communication in mathematics lectures by discussing the following concepts and
relationships between concepts:


Aspects of epistemology, regarding knowledge and knowing.



How epistemological aspects can be conveyed through properties of oral communication,
either explicitly (through direct statements about epistemological aspects) or more implicitly.



Aspects of knowledge, regarding conceptual and procedural knowledge, in relation to the types
of statements used in oral communication.



Aspects of knowing, regarding argumentation, in relation to the use of connect‐words.

Purpose
As noted in the introduction, the overarching purpose of this empirical study is to examine the types of
messages about mathematics inherent in, or conveyed by, properties in teaching. This purpose has now
been further specified; to examine properties of oral communication that could be said to convey
something about epistemological aspects of mathematics. That is, the purpose is to perform a type of
epistemological characterization of mathematics lectures. Through the conceptual framework, this
purpose has also been specified regarding different aspects of epistemology (the four points at the end
of the last section).
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The length of this paper is limited by not including results and analysis of the epistemological aspect of
knowing, thus only including the aspect of knowledge, regarding the different types of statements; use‐
and object‐statements. However, since the aspects of knowledge and knowing are integrated in the
analysis of data, both aspects are related to in the description of method.
Thus, the purpose of the present empirical study is to compare different lectures regarding how they,
through properties of statements in the oral presentations, convey something about epistemological
aspects of mathematics. In relation to this purpose, the following research questions are in focus:


Is there a tendency to use different types of statements in different lectures?



How can potential differences between the lectures be characterized?

Method
Two mathematics lectures at university level are analyzed in this empirical study. The lectures have
different lecturers and different mathematical content. One lecture is part of a course in calculus and
this particular lecture is about improper integrals, while the other lecture is part of a course in statistics
for natural scientists and this particular lecture is about some examples of discrete probability
distributions. Both lectures are approximately 45 minutes long. Only the lecturers’ activity is analyzed,
in order to focus on one type of discourse; the one used in lecturing, and not in for example dialogue.
The lectures were recorded with audio and video, but students’ statements are not audible in the
recordings and the camera is always focusing on the lecturer’s activity at the whiteboard.
The analysis in this paper focuses on the lecturers’ auditory communication, and the lectures were
transcribed from the audio recording, but using the video recording in case of doubt in the process of
transcription and in case of unclear references in the lecturers’ statements (e.g. referring to “this” or
“that” when pointing to something on the whiteboard).
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In order to create a clear structure in the analysis, statements from the lectures are analyzed in several
steps. The first step in the analysis is to mark use‐ and object‐statements, and also connect‐words in the
transcription. Each coherent section of the transcription is then extracted from the transcription, for
further analysis. A coherent section refers to a set of statements that are connected through the use of
connect‐words. Such a section can for example be only one conclusion together with an argument, as in
the following example from the lecture in calculus, where the connect‐words are in italics: “The
derivative of ln x is one over x, which is larger than zero, which means that it grows all the time”. Note
that there is actually a linguistic ambiguity about exactly what the word ‘which’ in ‘which means’ refers
to, but logically all information given before the conclusion is needed, and this full statement is
therefore regarded as the argument. A section can also include several argumentations, as in the
following example from the lecture in statistics, where the connect‐words are in italics:
And you can show that the expected value is one over p. This can be seen as. Yes if we imagine
that for example p is zero point two. Then this means that we will succeed on average every fifth
time. And this also means that the expected value then becomes one over zero point two, which
is five. So it is exactly that we will have to do on average five tries in this case.
A next step in the analysis, which is mostly relevant for sections that do not consist of a single
argumentation, is to extract the relevant statements from the excerpt and arrange them in a structured
manner, which for the latest example can be done in the following way, where the connect‐words are
in italics:
1. You can show that the expected value is one over p.
2. P is zero point two.
3. Means that: We will succeed on average every fifth time.
4. Means that: The expected value is one over zero point two, which is five.
5. So: We have to do on average five tries.
From this structure it is easier to analyze how the statements are related according to the connect‐
words, although the analysis has to include some considerations to what is reasonable, as was done in
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the previous example about the derivative, since it is not always clear exactly what is referred to as
being the argument for the conclusion. In such situations, the logically necessary statements previously
stated are listed as included in the argument. In the example above, we see that line 3 is only based on
line 2 as an argument, while line 4 cannot only be based on the previous line, although the exact same
type of connect‐words are used. The result of this type of analysis is then summarized in a three column
table with a conclusion, the argument(s) for this conclusion, and the connect‐words used in the
argumentation. From the example above, one line in the table thus becomes:
We will succeed on average every fifth time

P is zero point two

Means that

Based on the content of the produced tables, each lecture can then be characterized through
examining the different types of statements (use‐ and object‐statements); quantitatively regarding
which type of statement is most commonly used and qualitatively regarding the formulation of
statements of different kinds.
Results
Through utilization of the described method, the produced table for each lecture consists of 39 lines for
the calculus lecture and 43 lines for the statistics lecture. Each line in the table corresponds to one
argumentation, which consists of a conclusion, the statement(s) used as argument(s) for the conclusion,
and the connect‐words.
When studying how common the different types of statements are in the two lectures, a clear
difference between these lectures appears: In the calculus lecture, use‐statements appear as a
conclusion on four lines in the table (10 %) and as an argument on two lines (5 %), while in the statistics
lecture, use‐statements appear as a conclusion on 22 lines (51 %) and as an argument on 18 lines (42
%). Thus, in the calculus lecture object‐statements are most common, while in the statistics lecture the
two types of statements are about equally common.
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Besides this quantitative characterization of the use of different types of statements, it can also be
noted that there are many examples of statements of one type that can easily be reformulated in order
to turn it into a statement of the other type. For example, in the statistics lecture there is the use‐
statement “if you add a constant to all values of the function, this will not change the variation”, which
can be reformulated into a statement saying that a property (the variation) of two functions is the same
(i.e. an object‐statement). An example of the opposite type of reformulation is taken from the calculus
lecture, where there is the object‐statement “(the graph of) one over x has a similar appearance (as the
graph of one over x squared)”, which can be reformulated into “if we sketch the graph of one over x,
the result is similar as when we sketch the graph of one over x squared” (i.e. a use‐statement).
Conclusions
The study of use‐ and object‐statements shows a potential difference between the two lectures
regarding some epistemological aspects. However, since many statements seem easy to reformulate
into the other type of statement, there is some arbitrariness, but not necessarily randomness,
regarding what type of statement is used. These observations highlight the questions if or how these
properties of communication can be seen as primarily tied to the individual, to the mathematical
content, to the type of course, or to other aspects of the situation. These questions seem possible to
examine in more detail using the type of method for data analysis presented in this empirical study, but
for a larger set of data. Thus, it would be interesting to compare epistemological characterizations of
different settings (not only lectures) for the same person and of communication of different persons (in
particular to include also students) within one setting.

The use of different theories
Let us now return to the overarching purpose of this paper and discuss properties of the empirical study
in relation to the use of theory. In the conclusions in the empirical study it is questioned whether
properties in the discourse could be seen as tied to the individual, to the mathematical content, to the
type of course, or to other aspects of the situation. A possible way of examining this question is also
described, as a continuation of the use of the conceptual framework, through more extensive empirical
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studies regarding variations in properties of communication for different persons and different
situations. However, you could also see it as necessary to relate to a theory for the interpretation of the
results from the data analysis, for example in order to make it possible to relate to other kind of studies
that are examining similar kind of data or phenomena. This aspect of interpreting the results through a
theory can also be seen as a way of explaining the results by relating to a theory that describes more
general aspects of the observed situation or phenomenon. Two different theories are here introduced
as examples of the use of theory for interpreting and explaining the empirical results.
Introducing theory as a means to explain empirical results
It is here not possible to give full descriptions of two theories. Therefore, I relate to two theories that
are believed to be familiar enough for the reader to make the description and discussion
comprehensible. The two theories are here labeled as cognitive theory and discourse analytic theory.
From the short description of these theories given here it is not self‐evident that these can actually be
labeled as theories, according to the definition by Radford (2008). The label of each of these two
theories does not refer to a specific theory in the sense that I can refer to a specific article or book that
describes the theory, but refers to something that is common in several different specific theories.
Perhaps each of the two theories could be better characterized as an approach (Bergsten, 2008) or as a
perspective (Lester, 2005) – I return to the discussion of this issue.
A very short description of the foundation of each theory is given below, together with an
interpretation of the conclusions in the empirical study. Thereafter, the use of these two theories is
discussed, including a comparison based on Radford’s (2008) defining components of a theory.
The cognitive theory focuses on mental objects and processes of individuals. Regarding epistemological
properties of communication, focus can then be put on individuals’ epistemological beliefs. In addition,
a lecture can be described using the notions of sender and receiver. The lecturer’s beliefs can be seen
as a cause for how s/he presents the mathematics, for example that epistemological beliefs are a basis
for how it is argued that one knows something. How the lecturer presents the mathematics is then
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influencing how the students think about mathematics, including epistemological aspects. In this
theory, focus is on cause and effect, where the study of properties of communication in the lecture can
be relevant both as a sign of the lecturer’s beliefs and also as a potential cause for students’ beliefs.
This focus on cause and effect seems common in educational research about beliefs, for example when
studying teachers’ attributed beliefs (Speer, 2005) or when explaining students’ differences in
performance through differences in beliefs (Schommer, 1990).
Based on the cognitive theory, the empirical study can be said to characterize the lecturer, since focus is
on properties of individuals. The observed differences regarding properties of communication can then
be explained by that the lecturers have different epistemological beliefs, or at least that different
beliefs are active in the two lectures.
The discourse analytic theory focuses on the discourse in itself as a central process, and not seeing the
discourse as a product of other, more basic, (mental) processes. A lecture can then be described using
the notions of participation and enculturation in a discourse community. The lecturer’s statements are
not seen as a reflection of some cognitive structure, but as being constitutive themselves, as a part of
the social situation (Edwards, 1993). The study of properties of communication in the lecture can then
be relevant both for characterizing the discourse community and also by seeing the lecture as a part of
students’ enculturation (including becoming familiar with the discourse somehow related to
epistemological aspects of mathematics).
Based on the discourse analytic theory, the empirical study can be said to characterize the lecture, since
focus is on properties of the situation. The observed differences regarding properties of discourse can
then be explained by that different discourse communities are observed in the two lectures.
Looking back at the empirical study and the use of the two theories, the following summary can be
given.
1. Issue of classroom practice: Different messages about mathematics inherent in, or conveyed
by, properties of teaching.
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2. Purpose of research study: Examine epistemological characterizations of oral communication in
mathematics lectures.
3. Conclusion: Difference between two lectures regarding the epistemological characterization.
4. Interpretation/explanation:
(a) Alternative 1, cognitive theory: Properties of the lecturer, difference regarding beliefs.
(b) Alternative 2, discourse analytic theory: Properties of the lecture, difference regarding
discourse communities.
Above, the use of the two theories seems only to affect point 4, since these theories were introduced at
that stage. However, we need also to examine if and how other parts of the research process need to
be changed or reinterpreted in some way due to the introduction of a new theory.
The effect of theory on different parts of the research process
As a starting point, the two theories are compared based on the definition of theory by Radford (2008),
which relates to aspects of the research process, and here focus is on specific aspects of the presented
empirical study.
Regarding basic principles, both theories include the concepts of mental object/process and
communication/discourse, but a main difference between them is regarding where and how these
concepts are located in the hierarchical structure of the system. While the cognitive theory regards
properties of communication as an effect of mental processes, the discourse analytic theory begins “not
by questioning the existence or ontology of underlying cognitive representations but by questioning
their epistemological basis in discourse” (Edwards, 1993, p. 218).
Regarding methodology, the same empirical data, analyses and results in the empirical study are
relevant for both theories. This observation is specific for the present empirical study and does not
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mean that the same observation would always be made when using these two theories. In the next
section, relationships between theory and methodology are discussed more.
Regarding research questions, the same purpose and questions are used, and are of interest, for both
theories. However, in the process of interpreting/explaining the results it became clear that
‘epistemological characterization’ refers to different things in the two theories, whether characterizing
the lecturer or the lecture. This difference regarding research questions can be seen as stemming from
the differences regarding basic principles, which also Radford (2008, p. 322) highlights when noting that
“research questions must be clearly stated within the conceptual apparatus of the theory”.
When applying the two theories to the empirical study, some differences between the two theories
have been observed, in particular regarding basic principles that create different
interpretations/explanations of results and also a reinterpretation of the purpose. However, there are
also many similarities in the use of these two theories, which is evident in particular since it was
possible to introduce the theories at such a late stage of the research process, when the theories could
utilize the same empirical data, analyses and results. Thus, although some basic differences have been
noted between the theories, the same type of empirical study is relevant for both theories.
Another similarity in the use of the two theories is that, as noted when introducing them, both function
as explanation of the observed differences between lectures. That is, the question of what is “causing”
these differences is not an empirical question but the question is answered within each theory.
However, this question is only answered at a general level, and both theories have a common interest
in a type of follow‐up question that is not answered within the theories but that demands empirical
research; regarding the “limits” or “borders” for variations in the properties of communication. For the
cognitive theory, this issue can be described as dealing with how general or context dependent
epistemological beliefs are (see Limón, 2006), for example if it is reasonable to talk about
epistemological beliefs for mathematics in general or if the beliefs are different for different areas of
mathematics. For the discourse analytic theory, this issue can be described as dealing with the borders
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and overlaps between different communities (see Skott, 2009), for example if it is reasonable to talk
about a discourse for mathematics in general, regarding epistemology, or if different areas of
mathematics create their own discourse communities about epistemological aspects.
The “follow‐up question” discussed above is quite similar to the question asked at the end of the
empirical study, before the two theories were introduced, regarding what aspects of the observed
situation can be tied to the different properties of communication. Although the empirical study
described here is somewhat artificial and partly adjusted to suit the overarching purpose of the present
paper, this similarity of questions of interest at least shows a potential for such a similarity to exist.
Based on these similarities between the uses of the two theories it is suggested that, for the specific
topic of study in the present empirical study, the main difference between the two theories is a choice
of wording when describing the observed phenomenon. It seems possible to “translate” descriptions
within one theory into descriptions within the other theory, by noting what type of issue or
phenomenon is being referred to in the languages of the theories – similarly as suggested by Rodriguez
et al. (2008) in their comparison of theories. It should be noted, again, that this discussion focuses on
the use of theories in relation to one specific empirical study, and does not deal with a general
comparison of theories regarding their differences, similarities or compatibility. Therefore, it is not
necessarily the case that the same relationship between these theories would be evident in relation to
some other empirical study. This fact is also one important point I try to make; that it is more fruitful,
and even necessary, to discuss the use of theories in relation to specific empirical studies in order to be
able to examine if and how different theories, and different parts of theories, can affect different parts
of the research process.
The process of choosing a theory to use
If the similarities between the uses of the two theories in the present empirical study are so great that
the main difference is a choice of words, do we need to use a theory at all, or if we do, on what basis do
we choose a theory?
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Regarding the choice between the cognitive theory and the discourse analytic theory, this could be
based on a personal conviction about how to view the more general issue of the relationship between
mental processes and discourse. In this case, a choice between theories is perhaps not made, but the
specific theory used serves as a means to make explicit the personal conviction. Even if not made
explicit, these types of personal convictions can be labeled as theory. However, it can sometimes be of
interest to separate these more general types of theories when discussing the role of theory in
research, for example by labeling “a more informal inclination by the researcher to interpret an
observed commonsensical problem” as an approach (Bergsten, 2008, p. 192) or by labeling “the
viewpoint the researcher chooses to use to conceptualize and conduct the research” as a perspective
(Lester, 2005, p. 458).
There is also the option of not choosing any of the two (or other similar) theories in relation to the
empirical study. As previously described, questions triggered by the empirical results could be pursued
without adding a new theory. As mentioned, the same types of questions are also of interest within the
two theories, which might even more question whether it is relevant to add a new theory. Another
alternative could then be to use the results from continued empirical studies as a basis for choosing a
theory, regarding which theory seems more useful. For example, if further studies show that the
epistemological characterizations are more tied to the individual than to the situation; that the
variation is larger between individuals in the same situation than between situations for the same
individuals, a theory locating the source of variation at the individual level could be more suitable. In
this way, a theory is not seen as something generally applicable but the use of theory is adjusted
according to specific needs and circumstances, which is in line with the notion of conceptual framework
(Lester, 2005).
So far, after using a conceptual framework in the empirical study, two theories were introduced late in
the research process. It was then examined how the use of these theories can affect different parts of
the research process, in particular the interpretation/explanation of empirical results, the methodology,
and different aspects of research questions (including reinterpretation of existing ones and possible
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future questions of interest). These discussions about the use of theories in research can now be
expanded and deepened by also discussing the use of theoretical frameworks, which is done in the next
section by examining the possibility to introduce the two theories at an earlier stage in the research
process.

The use of conceptual and theoretical frameworks
As discussed in the introduction of this paper, in relation to Lester’s (2005) description of different
frameworks, a main difference between theoretical and conceptual frameworks is regarding the
relationship between research questions and theory. A simplified way of describing this relationship for
a theoretical framework is that the theory comes first and that the research questions follows from, or
are to some extent included in, the theory. For a conceptual framework on the other hand, the research
questions “decide” what type of theory to use.
Based on the specific empirical study described in the present paper, when using a conceptual
framework, it can be noted that it is not as simple as to say that research questions and theory are
“separated” from each other and that one “affects” the other. In the empirical study, the starting point
was a certain question, and based on this question there was a need to relate to and use certain
theories. However, the original question was then also made more specific through the use of these
theories. More generally, a research question cannot exist in a theoretical vacuum, but we could
perhaps distinguish different types of questions based on how closely connected they are to a theory.
For example, what Prediger (2008) labels as issues of classroom practice and Bergsten (2008) labels as
observed commonsensical problems could be seen as questions formulated based on more intuitive
grounds. However, these types of questions are not entirely non‐theoretical; in relation to the issue of
classroom practice given by Prediger, Radford (2008) states that the described issue would be difficult
to relate to if using a certain theory, and Bergsten notes the use of an approach (i.e. a more informal,
implicit type of theory) when interpreting the observed commonsensical problem. The types of
questions that are more intuitively formulated need to be made more precise in order to function as
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research questions, in particular that central concepts need to be defined and relationships between
them need to be described, which are central parts of a theory.
Thus, for a conceptual framework, there is a kind of dual relationship between research questions and
theory, but where, as Lester (2005) highlights, focus is always on arguments for choosing relevant
theories in relation to the topic of study. However, looking at the empirical study described in this
paper, it can be noted that the arguments for using a certain theory focus on the need for a certain type
of theory, for example a theory dealing with aspects of epistemology in mathematics or a theory
dealing with possible explanations of observed results. The choice of a specific theory of the needed
kind was then perhaps affected more by, for example, personal viewpoints or convictions (as discussed
also in the previous section). Thus, even if focus is on arguments for the relevance of theories used in
relation to the topic of study, there can be a complex relationship between theories (including the more
informal, implicit types) and research questions.
Instead of using a conceptual framework in the empirical study presented in this paper, what could the
effect be of using a theoretical framework? That is, we decide to use one theory beforehand, and let
this theory affect all aspects of the research process, in relation to a topic of study. In the following, a
comparison is made between the use of the cognitive theory and the discourse analytic theory, when
using them as part of a theoretical framework in relation to the same issue of classroom practice used
before; to examine the types of messages about mathematics inherent in, or conveyed by, properties in
teaching, including the limitation to focus on aspects of communication in teaching and epistemological
aspects of messages about mathematics. Of course, this thought experiment is rather artificial, in
particular since the described topic of study might not be equally relevant for both theories, but this
limitation is seen as relevant in order to highlight some aspects of the potential use of these theories.
Since I do not present any new empirical studies using these theories as part of theoretical frameworks,
I limit the discussion to research questions and methodology.
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Regarding the formulation of research questions in relation to the topic of study, it has already been
noted that the questions given in the empirical study are relevant to both theories but that they were
interpreted somewhat differently. Therefore, the arguments for studying these questions would be
different when using the two theories and the specific wording of the questions might also be different.
For example, the cognitive theory could formulate the questions more specifically about relationships
between epistemological beliefs and properties of discourse, while the discourse analytic theory could
formulate the questions more specifically about examining potential similarities and differences
between different communities.
Regarding methodology, the discourse analytic theory focuses on discourse in itself in communities,
and therefore focuses on the use of data from genuine situations in these communities, and not on
creating “artificial” situations for data collection. The recording of lectures represents data of such
genuine situations. The cognitive theory does not focus on discourse, but can be said to regard
recordings as the method for being able to observe, indirectly, aspects of mental objects and processes.
Therefore, for this theory there is openness for different types of data that could make it possible to
give an, indirect, picture of the mental. To only rely on recordings of lectures might then also be seen as
a limitation, since you do not know if it is epistemological beliefs that are the main cause of observed
differences. Instead, the cognitive theory could utilize a study with two parts; something similar as has
been done in the present empirical study together with a questionnaire or interview that in a more
direct manner could examine epistemological beliefs. These two parts of data could then be related to
each other in order to examine if/how epistemological beliefs affect the properties of discourse.
Thus, studies using the two theories as part of theoretical frameworks could have been quite different,
although starting with the same topic of study. These differences could make it difficult to notice the
potential similarities between the studies that have been noticed when starting with a conceptual
framework and applying the two theories later in the research process. Therefore, one argument
against using theoretical frameworks can be that potential similarities between studies focusing on the
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same kind of phenomenon or topic become more hidden. However, you could also argue in similar
manner for using theoretical frameworks. If several studies use the same theory, possibly examining
somewhat different phenomena, this could simplify the process of relating results from these studies to
each other and to see the results from one study in a broader perspective. For continued studies about
the role of theory in research it then becomes important to be aware of these different aspects of the
use of theory, in particular that it is central to not only compare different theories but to compare the
uses of different theories in specific empirical studies.

Conclusions
In relation to the given purpose of this paper, some central results of the discussions are here
summarized regarding four aspects of the use of theory in research: (1) The utilization of different types
of frameworks, (2) The utilization of different types of theories, (3) Relationships between different
parts of the research process and different parts of theories, and (4) Potential unification/integration of
theories in relation to the specific research topic of the empirical study.
Regarding the different types of frameworks, they seem to have different pros and cons in relation to
if/how we can relate results from different studies to each other in a fruitful manner. Theoretical
frameworks can simplify the comparison of results from studies that have used the same theory while
conceptual frameworks can simplify the comparison of studies using (partly) different theories.
Some more specific properties of conceptual frameworks have here been problemized, in particular
regarding the primacy of research questions when choosing theories to use, where focus is on the
relevance of the theories for a specific study. A complexity has been highlighted in the discussions of
the issue regarding relationships between research questions and theories. In particular, different types
of questions have been discussed, from more informal/intuitive interpretations of observations to more
specified research questions, and that the development of research questions occur in a dual
interaction with theories, where also different types of theories are active.
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Thus, different types of theories have been discussed based on how they are used; some theories are of
a more informal type that are perhaps most often not referred to explicitly as theories while other
theories are explicitly referred to and used in a study. Regarding the more informal types of theories,
authors label these types of theories in different ways, for example as approaches (Bergsten, 2008) or
perspectives (Lester, 2005), which both are described as something not part of a framework. Other
authors distinguish between background and foreground theories (Mason & Waywood, 1996). In this
paper, the relationships between these types of theories have not been discussed in depth, but there is
a need to create a more coherent structure of these types of theories, including utilization of explicit
definitions of central notions such as theory and framework. Such a structure would be beneficial for
the continued work on comparing the use of different (types of) theories in order to increase our
awareness of the role of theory in research.
Important when comparing different theories is to not only focus on how they are used but also how
they are chosen. The argumentation for choosing suitable theories is central for conceptual
frameworks, which creates a greater potential to also make explicit how the theories are used. For
theoretical frameworks, there might be a greater risk that focus is on stating what theory is used and
neither on why or exactly how. However, regardless of the kind of framework used, it can never be
taken for granted that all parts of a theory have affected all parts of the research process.
Several examples have been given showing that it is more fruitful and also necessary to discuss the use
of theories in specific empirical studies and not only to compare the descriptions of different theories.
The example in the present paper shows that there can be empirical studies that are very similar
although based on theories that can be seen as very different, and partially contradictory. This way of
comparing theories seems to become more common in mathematics education research, which is
shown by several studies referred to in this paper.
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Finally, I turn to the use of theories in relation to the specific topic of epistemological characterizations
of mathematical discourse. Based on a conceptual framework, using “smaller” theories, the addition of
two “larger” theories at the end of the research process did not add much to the empirical study. For
each theory a type of explanation of the empirical results was added, and there was also a
reinterpretation of the original purpose. These additions and changes were mostly a matter of wording
and suggestions for further studies were similar for both theories and also similar to the suggestions
given before the theories were introduced. The need to add any of these two theories is therefore
challenged. However, when instead using these two theories as part of a theoretical framework, the
empirical studies based on the two theories could have been more different, although then perhaps
hiding potential similarities between the uses of these theories and possibly creating results of more
limited usefulness. Thus, for continued studies of this topic it is suggested to continue using the
conceptual framework and continue the critical examination of possible future needs to add other
theories, of any size or type.
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